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A B S T R A C T
The holding of doubts about climate change is often referred to as ‘scepticism’. However, there has been a
lack of clarity in previous work as to what exactly this scepticism comprises. We integrate data obtained
from discussion groups and a nationally representative survey, to interrogate and reﬁne the concept of
climate change scepticism with respect to the views of members of the public. We argue that two main
types should be distinguished: epistemic scepticism, relating to doubts about the status of climate
change as a scientiﬁc and physical phenomenon; and response scepticism, relating to doubts about the
efﬁcacy of action taken to address climate change. Whilst each type is independently associated by
people themselves with climate change scepticism, we ﬁnd that the latter is more strongly associated
with a lack of concern about climate change. As such, additional effort should be directed towards
addressing and engaging with people’s doubts concerning attempts to address climate change.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1.1. Background
In developed nations, almost half of all greenhouse gas
emissions are tied to individual and household energy use, such
as space heating and private transportation (IEA, 2007). The
fostering of more sustainable lifestyles has therefore been a focus
of numerous initiatives and interventions (Abrahamse et al., 2005;
Bamberg and Mo¨ser, 2007). Another facet of public engagement is
political: citizens’ support is essential for bringing about progres-
sive energy and other climate policies (Lorenzoni et al., 2008;
Ho¨ppner and Whitmarsh, 2011), prompting research interest
regarding public participation in decision-making about climate
change (Backstrand et al., 2010).
Public concern about climate change has risen in many nations
for much of the past 20 years, and there has been cross-national,
general support for policy responses in this area (Brechin, 2010).* Corresponding author at: School of Psychology, Tower Building, Park Place,
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Open access under CC BY licensePersonal action on climate change is also important to a sub-
section of society (Wolf, 2011) and there is evidence that some pro-
environmental behaviours have become increasingly normalised
in recent years (Barr et al., 2011). Nevertheless, research has also
shown that numerous barriers operate at both the individual and
social levels that impede wider engagement (Lorenzoni et al.,
2007; Gifford, 2011; Markowitz and Shariff, 2012). Climate change
is often seen by people as a temporally distant phenomenon
primarily affecting other places, times or peoples (Gifford et al.,
2009; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006). It may have limited salience,
being considered a lower priority than other social and even
environmental issues (Nisbet and Myers, 2007), failing to evoke
strong emotional reactions (Weber, 2010) or even leading to a
sense of futility given its apparent immensity (Wolf and Moser,
2011).
The perceived absence of a popular mandate for political action
may also have undermined the pursuit of more ambitious climate
policies by governments (Compston and Bailey, 2008). Further-
more, recent studies have noted declines in the public’s acceptance
even of the central tenets of climate science (Spence et al., 2010;
Leiserowitz et al., 2010; Pidgeon, 2012). Given the timing of these
trends, they have been attributed variously to the global economic
downturn (Scruggs and Benegal, 2012), public attention cycles
(Ratter et al., 2012), the controversy surrounding hacked emails
from the University of East Anglia (Leiserowitz et al., 2010), the
inﬂuence of partisan advocacy groups (Brulle et al., 2012), and cold
weather events (Krosnick, 2010).. 
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The problematic nature of public perceptions has tended
increasingly to be talked of in terms of climate change ‘scepticism’
though it is often unclear exactly what this may comprise, beyond
a shorthand for disengagement or disbelief. The idea of scepticism
has been used, ﬁrstly, to refer to doubts and uncertainty about the
physical and scientiﬁc aspects of climate change. For example,
Poortinga et al. (2011) constrained their use of the construct to the
framework of Rahmstorf (2004) who characterised doubts about
climate change into trend, attribution and impact scepticism –
concerning doubts that warming is taking place at all, doubts about
an anthropogenic component, and regarding the harmfulness of
the impacts of climate change. However, applications of the notion
of scepticism in the literature are for the most part not limited to
this narrow framing – more commonly being extended to
conceptualise doubts about a wider range of societal, political
and personal responses to climate change.
Lorenzoni et al. (2007) for example apply the notion of
‘scepticism’ together with ‘uncertainty’ to refer to doubts among
the UK public with respect to scientiﬁc controversy – but also
concerning the perceived necessity and effectiveness of acting on
climate change. Smith and Leiserowitz (2012) categorised scepti-
cism according to the affective imagery associated by survey
respondents with climate change, identifying elements of scepti-
cism corresponding to doubts about the reliability of climate
science and an anthropogenic component – but also in terms of
‘associations with conspiracy theories’, ‘ﬂat denials’, and refer-
ences to ‘media hype’. Similarly, in a study of the determinants of
scepticism in the UK, Whitmarsh (2011) used a 12-item scale
containing items corresponding broadly to trend, attribution, and
impact scepticism – but in this same scale also incorporated
measures intended to gauge respondents’ positions concerning
alarmism in media reporting and the view that too much fuss is
made about climate change (i.e. that its importance is overstated).
Malpass et al. (2007) too refer to ‘sceptical citizens’ as being those
who harbour doubts about the placing of responsibility for action
at an individual level; and Tobler et al. (2012) have treated
scepticism as a construct encompassing doubts about information
sources and media exaggeration, relating to general ‘distrust’,
concerning a lack of perceived personal threat, and concerning the
relative importance of climate change compared to other issues.
This lack of clarity about what climate change scepticism
actually is has important implications. This is not least because the
concept is often used synonymously (and pejoratively) with ideas
such as contrarianism and denial, as where Nerlich (2010, p. 419)
refers to climate scepticism ‘‘in the sense of climate denialism or
contrarianism’’. With particular reference to Anderegg et al.’s
(2010) study of expert credibility in climate science in which these
labels are also used interchangeably, O’Neill and Boykoff (2010, p.
E151) caution against the imprecise use of such terminology,
arguing that:
Blanket labelling of heterogeneous views under. . . these
headings has been shown to do little to further considerations
of climate science and policy. . . Continued indiscriminate use of
the terms will further polarize views on climate change, reduce
media coverage to tit-for-tat ﬁnger-pointing, and do little to
advance the unsteady relationship among climate science,
society, and policy.
We argue in this paper, therefore, for a more rigorous treatment
of the construct of scepticism itself, as it pertains to public
understanding of climate change.
We contend that, to date, applications of the notion of
scepticism have been inconsistent and have often mixed disparate
types of perceptions – but that nevertheless their usage hascorresponded thematically to two broad treatments. The ﬁrst of
these concerns perceptions about scientiﬁc and physical matters,
such as regarding scientiﬁc consensus and an anthropogenic
component to climate change. The second concerns perceptions
about social and behavioural matters, including doubts about
responding to climate change at the individual and collective
scales, and concerning the communication and portrayal of climate
change.
Missing from the literature is an attempt to clarify and
distinguish between these two main strands of scepticism, both
conceptually and in terms of appraising whether these constitute
meaningful categories within the public’s own perspectives.
1.3. Roots of scepticism
Whilst the meaning of climate scepticism has varied across
studies, largely consistent ﬁndings have nevertheless been
obtained with respect to the socio-cultural and psychological
determinants of climate change perceptions. Both Poortinga et al.
(2011) and Whitmarsh (2011) found that older, more conservative
respondents were more likely to express climate scepticism, and
that people’s values were also important determinants. In the USA,
Smith and Leiserowitz (2012) obtained comparable effects, ﬁnding
that political and cultural worldviews predict risk perceptions
about climate change. Studies by Kahan et al. (2011) and Kahan
et al. (2012) have also observed that cultural worldviews are
important determinants of climate change perceptions (including
doubts about scientiﬁc consensus), arguing that this is due to
people’s tendency to form perceptions of societal risks in line with
the values of groups with which they identify. There has however
been no previous work that has attempted to ascertain whether
different scepticism types have common or divergent under-
pinnings. As well as developing a conceptual distinction between
scepticism types, we therefore seek to examine whether variants of
scepticism have common or dissimilar foundations in public
perceptions.
1.4. Aims of the study
We seek to understand in detail the nature of scepticism within
public understanding of climate change. Our approach is informed
by the use of both qualitative data (discussion group transcripts)
and quantitative data (survey ﬁndings). The study aims to obtain
insights about public scepticism through separate analyses of
these datasets, and subsequently to integrate the ﬁndings from
both phases in drawing overall conclusions.
2. Methodology and ﬁndings
2.1. Use of mixed methodology to understand public scepticism
The present study employs a mixed methods design utilising
two datasets obtained in the UK during 2010 and 2011. We ﬁrst
analyse participant talk (n = 47) arising from a series of guided
discussions around climate change, to explore the different ways in
which scepticism about climate change is expressed by people. The
framework developed in the qualitative phase is then extended
and reﬁned in a second, quantitative research phase through the
analysis of survey data (n = 500). In addition, we consider the
sociodemographic determinants of scepticism types, and their
relationship with levels of concern about climate change.
Finally, we synthesise the ﬁndings from the qualitative and
quantitative research phases to draw conclusions about the
principal characteristics of scepticism within public perspectives.
The general procedure used in the present study is illustrated in
Fig. 1.
Stage 3: Synthesis of ﬁndings from stages 1 and 2
Main scepcism types and constuents
Stage 2: Construcon and analysis of survey items  (quantave)
Assessment of underlying scepcism typology; 
Analysis of determinants and outcomes of scepcism
Stage 1: Themac analysis of scepcal discourses (qualitave)
Recurrent noons of scepcism within parcipant talk
Fig. 1. Mixed methods approach to understanding public scepticism.
Table 1
Scepticism themes identiﬁed through qualitative thematic analysis.
Category of scepticism Themes encompassed/subject of scepticism
Scientiﬁc/physical scepticism - Evidence base
- Scientiﬁc consensus
- Scientiﬁc expertise
- Conduct of science/(im)propriety
- Attribution (human causation)
- Impact (severity of climate change)
Social/behavioural scepticism - Responses at individual, societal level
- Responses at a political level
- Folk psychology (motivations of others)
- Portrayal and communication
- Climate change fatigue
S.B. Capstick, N.F. Pidgeon / Global Environmental Change 24 (2014) 389–401 3912.2. Qualitative phase: procedure and data treatment
Qualitative studies have proven valuable in providing in-depth
insights into public understanding of climate change (Wolf and
Moser, 2011). The consideration of qualitative data in the present
study likewise enables us to explore nuances in people’s doubts
about climate change. It is our intention through the analysis to
reveal how scepticism manifests in participants’ own talk in a
relatively spontaneous manner, and with respect to a number of
different conceptual domains.
2.2.1. Study participants and data gathering
The qualitative data derives from a series of focus group
discussions undertaken during March and April 2010 in Bristol, UK.
Forty-seven members of the general public took part (anonymised
here using numerical codes), recruited to be representative in
terms of age, gender, and socio-economic grade. Each of ﬁve groups
of individuals met on two occasions, separated by several days,
resulting in ten focus group transcripts. Each group’s discussions
lasted around 3 h in total.
At the ﬁrst meeting, views were explored with respect to
climate science, responsibility for addressing climate change, and
the role of individual behaviour in mitigating climate change.
During the second meeting, more structured themes were
explored, especially concerning perspectives on the recent
COP15 Copenhagen conference, views on media reporting, and
responses to policy options. Further detail concerning the
materials and procedures used can be found in Capstick (2012).
2.2.2. Data analysis
The analysis of discussion group transcripts for the present study
was carried out in parallel with a wider discourse analysis in which a
series of distinct, commonplace and recurrent ways of understand-
ing climate change was identiﬁed across several samples of UK
participants (Capstick, 2012). This wider analysis integrated the
approach of Dryzek (1997) in which discourses are viewed as shared
ways of apprehending the world that are embedded in particular
language constructions; together with the discursive psychological
approach of Potter and Wetherell (1987) through which discourses
are seen both as sense-making devices and as possessing
interactional functions. Using this approach, Capstick (2012) argued
for the presence of a series of coherent discourses which
encompassed scientiﬁc, social and personal dimensions of climate
change (see Table S1, supplemental information).
The present study focuses upon the presence of sceptical
perspectives towards climate change which span these differentconceptual domains. The scepticism themes are developed using
an iterative procedure which both recognises prior categories/
themes, and also draws on analysis grounded in the transcript
data (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992, 2006) thus combining
elements of both inductive and theoretical thematic analysis
(Braun and Clark, 2006). For example, we apply the term
‘attribution scepticism’ in a similar manner to its use within
published studies of scepticism (e.g. Poortinga et al., 2011) but
elsewhere derive concepts in a more grounded manner: for
example we discuss the idea of ‘response scepticism’ in the
context of doubts commonly expressed by participants around
the value of action taken to address climate change; consider
articulations of doubts around human nature and the human
condition; and identify participants’ scepticism in the context of
views towards academic impropriety (issues which were salient
at the time in light of so-called ‘Climategate’).
Two broad categories of meaning derived and simpliﬁed from
Capstick (2012) are used as an organising (‘top-down’) framework
within which we seek to identify commonplace expressions of
scepticism. These overarching categories we refer to as ‘scientiﬁc/
physical’ scepticism and ‘social/behavioural’ scepticism. The
former category incorporates doubts towards the scientiﬁc and
physical aspects of climate change – such as regarding the evidence
base, physical reality and human component to climate change.
The latter category is used to group doubts about responses to
climate change at the personal and collective level, and concerning
the communication and portrayal of climate change. Both of these
are treated as prior but provisional categories, used to organise the
scepticism themes within participant talk, and subsequently to
construct a set of survey items. Their utility as conceptual
categories is then revisited where drawing our overall conclusions
about public climate change scepticism.
As well as characterising these themes thematically we
consider their function both in sense-making and as linguistic
devices which are able to be used by people in interaction to
legitimate and justify behaviour, or lack thereof (Kurz et al., 2005;
MacLennan, 2010; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). This attention to
the purposes to which different types of scepticism are put enables
additional insights into their signiﬁcance within people’s overall
understanding of climate change.
2.3. Qualitative phase results
Within the ‘scientiﬁc/physical’ framework we identify six
scepticism themes; within the ‘social/behavioural’ framework
we identify ﬁve scepticism themes. These are outlined in summary
in Table 1.
2.3.1. Scientiﬁc/physical scepticism themes
Doubts were commonly expressed across the 2010 data
concerning the evidence base for climate science, portrayed as
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example, it was asserted that climate science was characterised by
‘‘a lot of conﬂicting information’’ (P1), ‘‘conﬂicting stats’’ (P2), and
that there were ‘‘a lot of very very different theories out there’’ (P3).
Participants elsewhere questioned the reliability of evidence in
climate science, for example where P4 argues that reliable data
does not exist for past climatic conditions: ‘‘I know the ice cores
give us a lot more information, but it’s not real in the sense that you
haven’t got any written down experience of what the climate was
in those days’’. This assertion was made in the context of a wider
discussion around the strength of the case for climate change – in
which other participants also advanced arguments regarding the
incompleteness of the scientiﬁc evidence base. As P1 succinctly
remarks during this discussion: ‘‘if it’s unproven everybody just
say OK, no idea, and just back off.’’
In a related way, a sense was also given of a lack of consensus
in climate science, for example as where P5 suggests ‘‘the scientiﬁc
people aren’t exactly a hundred percent on this, there’s a big
minority which is pretty sceptical as well’’ and P6’s suggestion that
‘‘it’s often the case with this subject, that there just doesn’t seem to
be a straight line on it’’. In general terms, climate scientiﬁc
expertise was also able to be questioned, such that ‘‘there’s the fear
– there’s the experts, do they really know what they’re on about?
Which is justiﬁable scepticism I think.’’ (P7). P8 similarly questions
reliance on expertise in climate science, by way of analogy with the
2008 ﬁnancial crisis, arguing:
These people [climate scientists] are experts, but we have
expert economists that screwed up the economy, so why is a
scientist going to be any more of an expert than someone else
that predicts the future?
In terms of the function of these expressions of scepticism, in
the main these arguments tend to be put forward by participants to
directly challenge the veracity of climate change or an anthropo-
genic component, and/or to portray uncertainty within climate
science. Typically such arguments arose within discussion either
where participants jointly afﬁrmed their doubts about the science
and/or physical realities of climate change, or were used by
participants to question the knowledge claims of others. For
example, the assertion above by P8 linking climate science
expertise to the ineptitude of ‘expert’ economists was made in
direct response to another participant’s explicit endorsement of
climate scientists.
Scepticism concerning the capacities of (climate) science may
also be employed to support a self-declared sceptical stance. For
example, the above comment from P5 regarding lack of scientiﬁc
consensus occurred subsequent to his having ﬁrst stated that ‘‘I am
a sceptic’’ and been asked to expand further on this. Later in this
same group’s discussion, P5 again supports his sceptical stance by
referring to a perceived inconsistency in scientiﬁc predictions:
One of the reasons I am sceptical is because in the 1970’s it was
going to be the start of a new ice age. So in thirty years we’ve
gone from the start of a new ice age to global warming.
Attribution scepticism was also commonplace across the
discussions, and commonly contextualised to very long timeframe
(including cyclical) climatic change, for example through the
assertion that climate change ‘‘has been happening since the last
ice age, it’s the planet’s response to what’s gone before’’ (P9).
Attribution scepticism was not generally employed by participants
to argue against any anthropogenic component to climate change,
rather was seen to diminish the relevance of human activity. Thus
for example P10 argues that ‘‘I think man does contribute to
[climate change] but to the degree, I think it’s very slight’’.
Arguments characteristic of attribution scepticism were used as
rejoinders to assertions about the importance of climate change.For example, P11 responds to another participant’s contention that
‘‘all the reputable science on the matter is that global warming is
happening and it’s as a result of human actions’’ by suggesting that
whilst ‘‘we’ve got something to do with it’’ nevertheless ‘‘I also
think that global warming is natural, and [that] climate changes. . .
since the planet began’’. This provides an alternative, plausible
explanation for climate change, without suggesting that the
phenomenon is entirely false. Following this remark, a third
participant (P12) also responds in line with this argument, stating:
‘‘I think the same, sort of idea that obviously we are part of it but
there’s a natural cycle as well’’.
Such arguments are important for their tendency to character-
ise climate change as something which is not unprecedented or
unexpected – and as such not justifying particular concern. This is
also illustrated by the argument of P13 who uses the analogy of
human ageing to play down the importance of climate change:
[I]t’s just natural and it just happens, because I suppose it’s like
us as a person, we change as we get older, so I guess the Earth is
changing as it gets older.
The use (twice) of the term ‘just’ in this context acts discursively
to diminish the cause for concern of such a ‘natural’ process.
Arguments characteristic of impact scepticism were also used by
participants to suggest that climate change was less of a problem
than was often assumed to be the case. This could be maintained
even where explicitly accepting the veracity of climate change: as
P5 suggests, ‘‘I’m not saying it’s not happening, but. . . I wouldn’t
have thought it was quite as disastrous as some people perhaps
make us think it will be’’. Similarly, P14 suggests that ‘‘I don’t think
there’s many people in society who don’t believe there is a
problem. I think what they all struggle to believe is the extent of
the problem’’.
In the context of a question about whether they were of the
view that climate change would have consequences for them
personally, P12 likewise argues that ‘‘you’re talking about a couple
of degrees in the next ﬁfty years or something. . . I don’t think it’ll
have a huge effect’’. Again, this participant did not seek here to
argue that climate change was not ‘real’ however does state that its
impact (for him at least) is seen as minimal.
Allegations of academic impropriety salient in the media at the
time (so-called ‘Climategate’), were referred to only in three of the
ﬁve focus groups, with the associated stories described as having
‘‘added to the confusion’’ (P15); and that it ‘‘didn’t help, whether
the case is true or not [it] adds an element of doubt’’ (P1).
The controversy was however reported as having damaged
trust, such that these events had ‘‘chip[ped] away at the very
bedrock of the arguments of global warming’’ (P16). P17 relates the
story to diminishing trust in climate science, and also refers to the
implications of this for his own behavioural responses to climate
change:
I think that at the end of the day we’re trusting. . . the people
who are giving us all these ideas. . . we trust that those facts are
correct. So I suppose if you’re told that they’re not correct or if
for some reason that trust is mislaid, where do you go from
there? Do you think. . . ‘well, what am I actually contributing? I
can’t trust them, whatever they say, it could be right it could be
wrong’. So it’s difﬁcult, it’s difﬁcult.
2.3.2. Social/behavioural scepticism themes
Themes encompassed within the social/behavioural scepticism
framework relate to doubts about the signiﬁcance of responses
taken to address climate change, doubts concerning human nature
and motivations, as well as scepticism directed towards the
communication and portrayal of climate change and in the context
of people’s own climate change ‘fatigue’.
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concerned responses to climate change. This theme we term
response scepticism – encompassing doubts about the effective-
ness of responding to climate change, and concerning the ability
and willingness of social actors to respond to it. It is applied at
every level from the individual, to a general social collective level,
to national and international responses to climate change.
At the individual level, participants often expressed doubts
which were contextualised to the lack of efﬁcacy of one’s own
behavioural responses to climate change. For example, P18
remarks:
I can’t help thinking whether I sort my glass from my cardboard
doesn’t really have very much effect on the melting of the ice
caps. I know if everyone did it it would, but it is tokenism at the
moment. It’s more about making us feel better than actually
doing anything about the problem.
Similarly, P13 expresses response scepticism about household
recycling and uses the term ‘cynical’ with respect to this:
Me recycling one wine bottle am I really going to save the
world? I’m not. If I don’t put my photocopying paper in the
recycling is it going to make a huge amount of difference?. . . I’m
cynical about the whole thing.
As well as characterising a general scepticism towards the
framing of climate change in terms of individual responsibility,
assertions such as P13’s may be used to account for a lack of
personal engagement with climate change. Likewise, in the
following exchange two participants provide a context in which
individual inaction is portrayed as entirely justiﬁable:
P19:If you and I change what we do. . . it doesn’t really make any
difference whatsoever.
P5: If I don’t eat cows [reference to sustainability of meat-
eating], it doesn’t make a big difference.
Such remarks afﬁrm participants’ doubts around behavioural
responses, and these types of argument also extend to misgivings
about the wider social context in which such behaviour occurs. For
example, the following exchange points to a scepticism around
individual responses both in terms of their efﬁcacy and their
meaning:
P12: You just feel – although I would like to do something about
it – helpless almost. You do a bit of paper recycling, and
whatever, and how much difference is it going to make?
P18: It’s becoming like a religion. . . it’s like: ‘how can I show
how holy I am.? I know what I’ll do, I’ll put the recycling bin out,
that’ll show what a good person I am!’
P20: There is a certain holier than though element to some
people around it.
Unlike in many of the instances of scientiﬁc/physical scepti-
cism, it is important to note that these arguments are not being
used to suggest climate change is not a legitimate concern (indeed
as P12 notes, ‘‘I would like to do something about it’’), but rather to
cast doubt on both the value and purpose of people’s responses to it.
As well as doubts about the efﬁcacy of personal responses,
scepticism was expressed concerning people’s motivations and in
more general ways about the human condition – what has been
termed a folk psychology of climate change (cf. Fischer et al.,
2011). Folk-psychological explanations were commonly employed
to explain people’s resistance to change, for example that ‘‘we live
in the moment too much’’ (P21), or that achieving behavioural
change entails ‘‘changing habits. . . which is the most difﬁcult thing
of all’’ (P11); that ‘‘we’re a bit lucky and a bit lazy’’ (P22); and that
‘‘people are basically selﬁsh, and lazy. . . and it’s very difﬁcult to
change that’’ (P20).Participants often referred to human nature in a negative
manner, for example ‘‘I don’t think the human race can control
themselves’’ (P23), or that ‘‘the capacity of the human race to just
block stuff out. . . is very very terrifying’’ (P14). Lack of action was
attributed to this innate ‘human’ problem, whereby ‘‘deep within
us as human beings, it’s very difﬁcult to say: right I have to take an
action on something that’s not affecting me . . . at this point in
time’’ (P16).
Such doubts were also situated in the context of cultural
expectations; as P24 explains:
Over time humans have. . . got used to a way of life, and we
pretty much do what we want, when we want. And even though
we probably know that it’s having some effect, you particularly
probably don’t really care. Or at least not care enough to
actually physically change our behaviour.
P24 uses a similar line of argument at a later stage of discussion,
in direct response to another participant’s contention that action
on climate change is both justiﬁed and a matter of personal
responsibility. This individual having argued that ‘‘even if there
was only a ten percent chance of the world becoming uninhabit-
able, then I think it’s up to us to do something about it’’, P24
responds:
I just want to say to [participant], is your point by saying that,
that we should all be more concerned than we actually are?
Because. . . if we have a hundred years to save the planet, no one
seems too bothered really. . . the world has just sort of accepted
it. . . and as long as my four by four still goes up my highways. . .
This argument is revealing for its characterisation of people-in-
general as unconcerned even under conditions where major risks
from climate change may be recognised.
With the COP15 conference having occurred just prior to the
group discussions, substantial scepticism was also expressed
regarding the political response to climate change. For example,
one participant offered the perspective that ‘‘all the world’s
governments can’t manage to cobble together anything between
them, despite all saying that they need to’’ (P19); another that
‘‘unfortunately we’re in the hands of the world leaders. That is the
bottom line, we can do what we can do, but as we’ve found out they
all ﬂy from all directions [to COP15] and come up with no answers’’
(P25). Scepticism was also expressed more generally regarding
short-termism inherent to politics and its implications for
addressing climate change, such that ‘‘they [politicians] are only
in power for so long. . . they will always look for short-term
solutions to make sure people are happy with the decisions they
make, therefore they’re unable to make a long-term solution’’
(P17). Similarly, it was argued that political action would be
stymied by the long-term nature of climate change: ‘‘targets are
being set. . . so far in the future that is there any point?. . . if
someone held a gun to someone’s head they could pretty much
change everything pretty quickly, but they don’t’’ (P3).
These types of argument were often put forward by participants
to afﬁrm that political action is necessary but unlikely actually to
occur. In addition to the sense that political will and capacity is
lacking, participants expressed the view that climate change has
become a political contrivance – i.e. treated as an issue of
expedience. This is revealed by remarks such as ‘‘it’s [climate
change] just another big political buzz-word at the moment
towards the election’’ (P26), or ‘‘I think it’s a bit of a bandwagon’’
(P27). Such remarks convey a certain cynicism towards climate
change and terms such as ‘buzz-word’ and ‘bandwagon’ situate the
issue as one associated with hype rather than being of genuine
concern.
Participants also expressed scepticism about the portrayal and
communication of information about climate change. Media
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sensationalism, for example where P10 argues ‘‘I don’t think it’s
the scientists so much [mis-representing]. It’s a lot run by the
media. . . the media gets hold of things, and spin things out of
control’’.
Newspapers were elsewhere characterised as unreliable
sources of news about climate change, as ‘‘wanting to give people
what they think they want’’ (P16) and as emphasising ‘bad’ news
for ﬁnancial gain. Elsewhere, doubts were expressed regarding the
portrayal of climate change by environmentalists who were seen
as being ‘‘prepared to go for the headline information and therefore
look at the doomsday scenario’’ (P28).
These arguments tend to characterise the risks from climate
change as having been overstated by different social actors, or as
otherwise promoting particular agendas or vested interests. One
participant (P16) expresses their view in this area in the speciﬁc
context of a wider discussion around people’s being ‘weary’ or
‘tired’ of climate change:
I get weary of the constant message that comes through about
global warming, that it’s coming at us through the airwaves and
through the television. And newspapers and television have to
sell their stories and everything else, but I get weary of the drum
that’s constantly banged.
Elsewhere too, participants’ doubts about climate change were
characterised by what we term climate change fatigue. P29 for
example remarks that ‘‘you get disaster fatigue as well I think, you
know: ‘oh god, not another polar bear,’ whatever it is’’. Elsewhere, a
participant directly relates her own scepticism to doubts of this
nature:
I have put scepticism [during written exercise]. It’s not that I
don’t agree with it. . . [but] look, we’ll handle it, it’ll be ﬁne,
humans have been around for however many years and we’ve
all adapted to be where we are today so I’m sure we can cope
with it again, it’s just made into this massive issue that it’s
not. . . I just can’t be bothered with it. (P30)
Whilst afﬁrming that she accepts – in some sense – the veracity
of climate change, this remark is revealing for portraying a
particular type of reaction which by the participant’s own terms is
associated with scepticism.
2.3.3. Differences in content and function between scientiﬁc/physical
and social/behavioural scepticism
There are important distinctions between the arguments and
explanations advanced as part of scientiﬁc/physical scepticism as
compared to social/behavioural scepticism.
In the former case, the focus of participants’ scepticism is the
veracity or certainty of some aspect of climate change. It may be
asserted that it is unclear whether climate change exists – more
usually, however, uncertainty is associated with the knowledge
basis and claims made around climate change. Participants employ
this type of scepticism primarily to argue against or downplay the
legitimacy of climate science or the signiﬁcance of climate change
as a physical phenomenon – and in doing so often imply a resultant
lack of concern.
In the case of social/behavioural scepticism, by contrast, the
truth status of climate change is not generally disputed – indeed is
in places explicitly acknowledged. Instead, participant doubts
relate to judgements about the value, efﬁcacy and likelihood of
responding to climate change at the personal and collective levels;
as well as doubts about the portrayal of climate change and the
relevance of climate change as a contemporary concern. Partici-
pants may employ this type of scepticism to justify or explain lack
of personal action on climate change, or as a way of distancing
themselves from the need or requirement to do so.2.4. Quantitative phase: survey instrument design and procedure
2.4.1. Respondent sample and survey administration
A nationally representative (by age, gender, socio-economic
grade) quota sample of the British population aged 18 years and
over (n = 500) was recruited during February 2011 to complete the
online survey instrument. The items used in the present study
formed part of a larger survey measuring perspectives on climate
change (including in comparison to other risk issues and
concerning climate policy). Items were randomised within the
wider survey using the survey software package, to preclude
ordering effects.
2.4.2. Measures of climate change scepticism
Twenty items were used to measure climate change scepticism
utilising the dual framework developed in the qualitative phase. Ten
items measured components of scientiﬁc/physical scepticism and
ten items measured components of social/behavioural scepticism.
Table 2 provides an overview of item wording, constructs these
items are intended to measure, and their derivation. Each was
measured on a 5-point bi-polar scale asking respondents to
indicate level of agreement (ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to
‘strongly agree’).
The items used in this research phase were selected or devised
speciﬁcally for their correspondence with the salient themes
arising from the qualitative thematic analysis. Several of the items
used are replications or modiﬁcations of measures used by
Whitmarsh (2009, 2011) and we also include an item modiﬁed
from Tobler et al. (2012). A number of items also reﬂect key themes
from the literature with respect to climate change scepticism, for
example corresponding to trend, attribution and impact scepticism
(Rahmstorf, 2004; Poortinga et al., 2011).
2.4.3. Measures of cultural worldviews
Worldviews were measured using items derived from Leiser-
owitz et al. (2010) and Rippl (2002) in line with the cultural theory
of risk perception (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson,
2003). Previous studies have found that worldviews measured
according to this framework are important predictors of climate
change perceptions (Leiserowitz et al., 2010; Kahan et al., 2012).
The present study applies measures of Egalitarianism and
Individualism as these have been found to be particularly salient
(Leiserowitz et al., 2010). Three items were used to measure each
of the two types of worldview; see Table 3. As with the scepticism
items, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they
agreed or disagreed with each of these statements.
The two cultural worldviews are assumed to be orthogonal
constructs; a principal components analysis using Varimax
rotation of the six items conﬁrms this (two clear factors were
obtained together explaining 53% of total variance). The resulting
components obtained are used in the regressions reported in
Section 2.5.4.
2.4.4. Socio-demographics, pro-environmental identity, self-reported
knowledge, self-identifying scepticism and climate change concern
Data was obtained for survey respondents’ age, gender, voting
intention, and level of education.
Pro-environmental identity was measured through (dis)agree-
ment with the statement ‘Being environmentally friendly is an
important part of who I am’. This measure has been used
previously by Spence et al. (2010).
Self-reported knowledge was assessed through (dis)agreement
with the statement ‘I am well-informed about climate change’.
Self-identifying climate scepticism was measured through (dis)-
agreement with the statement ‘I consider myself to be a climate
change sceptic’.
Table 2
Scepticism survey items with corresponding constructs and derivation.
Item wording Construct Previous use/novel item
Scientiﬁc/physical scepticism measures
There is too much conﬂicting evidence about climate change to
know whether it is actually happening
Trend scepticism (‘actually happening’);
scepticism about evidence base
(‘conﬂicting evidence’)
Whitmarsh (2011)
Current climate change is part of a pattern that has been going on
for millions of years
Attribution scepticism Novel item
Climate change is just a natural ﬂuctuation in Earth’s temperatures Attribution scepticism Whitmarsh (2011)
Even if we do experience some consequences from climate change,
we will be able to cope with them
Impact scepticism Novel item
The effects of climate change are likely to be catastrophic (reverse coded) Impact scepticism Whitmarsh (2011)
The evidence for climate change is unreliable Scepticism about evidence base Whitmarsh (2011)
There are a lot of very different theories about climate change, and little
agreement about which is right
Scepticism about scientiﬁc consensus
and expertise
Novel item
Scientists have in the past changed their results to make climate
change appear worse than it is
Scepticism about climate science conduct Novel item
Scientists have hidden research that shows climate change is not serious Scepticism about climate science conduct Novel item
Climate change is a scam Scepticism about climate science conduct Modiﬁcation of item used in
Tobler et al. (2012)
Social/behavioural scepticism measures
Climate change is so complicated, that there is very little politicians
can do about it
Response scepticism (political) Novel item
There is no point in me doing anything about climate change because
no-one else is
Response scepticism (personal) Whitmarsh (2009)
The actions of a single person don’t make any difference in tackling
climate change
Response scepticism (individual level) Whitmarsh (2009)
People are too selﬁsh to do anything about climate change Response scepticism (‘folk psychology’) Whitmarsh (2009)
Not much will be done about climate change, because it is not in
human nature to respond to problems that won’t happen for many years
Response scepticism (‘folk psychology’) Novel item
It is already too late to do anything about climate change Response scepticism (fatalism) Whitmarsh (2009)
The media is often too alarmist about climate change Scepticism about portrayal/communication Modiﬁcation of item used in
Whitmarsh (2011)
Environmentalists do their best to emphasise the worst possible
effects of climate change
Scepticism about portrayal/communication Novel item
Climate change has now become a bit of an outdated issue Climate ‘fatigue’ Novel item
Whether it is important or not, on a day-to-day basis I am bored of
hearing about climate change
Climate ‘fatigue’ Novel item
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point scale from 1 (not at all concerned) to 5 (very concerned).
2.5. Survey analysis
2.5.1. Principal components analysis of scepticism items
To ascertain whether the scepticism sub-types developed in
Section 2.3 comprised separate constructs within the survey data, a
principal components analysis (PCA) was carried out on the 20
scepticism items as detailed in Table 2. Principal components
analysis is a technique for determining the latent structure of a set
of variables, which operates by identifying groups of variables
which inter-correlate (the components). Each component obtained
through a PCA represents an underlying dimension (termed a
‘factor’ within this procedure having been interpreted and named).
PCA is used in the present study to examine whether the range ofTable 3
Cultural worldview items.
Item wording Construct
The world would be a better place if its wealth were
divided equally among nations
Egalitarianism
Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious
problem in our society
Egalitarianism
In my ideal society, all basic needs (food, housing,
education, health care) would be guaranteed by the
government for everyone
Egalitarianism
When I have problems, I try to solve them on my own Individualism
People should be allowed to make as much money as
they can for themselves, even if others are not able to
Individualism
If the government spent less time trying to ﬁx
everybody’s problems, we’d all be a lot better off
Individualismmeasures corresponding to different scepticism constructs can be
explained by a smaller number of coherent factors.
Table 4 shows the item loadings (strength of association of each
item with the corresponding component) within the pattern
matrix obtained from the PCA.
A distinction between scepticism types as considered in the
present study has not previously been tested or predicted on the
basis of theory; we thus utilised an exploratory factor analysis to
examine associations between item scores. We did not expect that
factors obtained would be orthogonal constructs (i.e. completely
unrelated), given that the literature has pointed to an association
between different measures of scepticism (e.g. Poortinga et al.,
2011). Therefore, an oblique (oblimin) rotation was carried out,
permitting the components derived to correlate. Missing values
were excluded in a pairwise manner (statistical procedures omit
missing cells rather than complete cases with any missing cells);
348 respondent cases were retained for the full PCA. Further checks
were carried out to ensure that the sample size was adequate for
the PCA performed, and that the variables used were correlated at
an appropriate level for this type of analysis. There were no
problems identiﬁed concerning sampling adequacy or sphericity
(inter-variable correlation) based on the KMO statistic (.95) and
Bartlett’s test (p < .001); no variables were found to inter-correlate
at a level higher than .8 (multicollinearity is not a problem).
Three factors are obtained from the principal components
analysis (based on a criterion of eigenvalues > 1, an accepted
indicator of a reasonable minimum variance to be explained by
components from a PCA). The majority of items loaded on the ﬁrst
and third of these factors. The components together accounted for
62% of variance. Means and standard deviations shown in Table 4
correspond to a score of 5 as a ‘strongly agree’ response and a score
Table 4
Principal components analysis of scepticism items.
Item wording Component loadings Item scores
1 2 3 Mean (SD) Agree (%)
There is no point in me doing anything about climate change because no-one else is .839 .011 .005 2.39 (1.05) 13.0
It is already too late to do anything about climate change .775 .127 .099 2.65 (1.07) 19.5
The actions of a single person don’t make any difference in tackling climate change .715 .051 .028 2.87 (1.17) 30.2
Climate change is so complicated, that there is very little politicians can do about it .650 .066 .161 2.95 (1.16) 34.9
Climate change has now become a bit of an outdated issue .598 .175 .280 2.57 (1.12) 20.3
Climate change is a scam .576 .232 .322 2.37 (1.20) 17.7
Whether it is important or not, on a day-to-day basis I am bored of hearing about climate change .550 .140 .357 2.93 (1.17) 29.9
People are too selﬁsh to do anything about climate change .048 .817 .147 3.70 (0.87) 65.1
Not much will be done about climate change, because it is not in human nature to respond to
problems that won’t happen for many years
.467 .660 .037 3.49 (0.94) 53.2
The effects of climate change are likely to be catastrophic (reverse coded) .293 .480 .207 3.44 (1.02) 50.3
There are a lot of very different theories about climate change, and little agreement about which is right .209 .060 .850 3.76 (0.88) 69.2
Environmentalists do their best to emphasise the worst possible effects of climate change .103 .138 .759 3.81 (0.86) 68.2
Current climate change is part of a pattern that has been going on for millions of years .044 .001 .747 3.66 (0.98) 58.2
The media is often too alarmist about climate change .184 .066 .649 3.56 (1.12) 54.3
There is too much conﬂicting evidence about climate change to know whether it is actually happening .267 .079 .621 3.29 (1.13) 45.9
Climate change is just a natural ﬂuctuation in Earth’s temperatures .306 .077 .615 3.30 (1.08) 43.1
Scientists have in the past changed their results to make climate change appear worse than it is .279 .097 .603 3.24 (1.08) 40.8
The evidence for climate change is unreliable .403 .148 .534 3.06 (1.17) 35.6
Scientists have hidden research that shows climate change is not serious .399 .135 .453 2.78 (1.02) 20.3
Even if we do experience some consequences from climate change, we will be able to cope with them .303 .288 .339 3.11 (0.91) 31.1
Components within the table correspond to groupings that reﬂect the underlying structure across the set of items as a whole. Where items have high (positive) loadings these
are strongly associated with a component, compared to those with lower loadings. Negative loadings reﬂect a negative association. Loadings over .4 are shown in bold;
proposed component structure is highlighted. Means and standard deviations correspond to a score of 5 as a ‘strongly agree’ response and a score of 1 a ‘strongly disagree’
response. Levels of overall agreement (‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ responses) across the sample are also given.
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(percentage of respondents answering either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly
agree’) are also given. For the item ‘The effects of climate change
are likely to be catastrophic’, mean scores and level of agreement
are given in Table 4 prior to the reverse coding of the item for the
principal components analysis.
2.5.2. Interpretation of the principal components analysis
The structure from the principal components analysis is
interpreted below. The components derived correspond in some
respects to the dual framework developed in the qualitative phase
– however there are a number of distinctions arising between the
two research phases, which are reﬂected in the nomenclature used
to characterise the underlying factors obtained.
2.5.2.1. Factor 1: Response scepticism. The ﬁrst component from the
PCA corresponds most closely to those constructs from the
qualitative thematic analysis comprising what we have termed
‘response scepticism’. The highest-loading items convey re-
sponse scepticism at the personal, political and general level. We
argue therefore that this label offers the most suitable
characterisation of this factor – although further items which
clearly and uniquely load on this component correspond to those
representing climate fatigue, as well as the view that climate
change is a ‘scam’.
2.5.2.2. Factor 2: Folk psychology scepticism. The second compo-
nent from the PCA has a less clear and comprehensive conceptual
structure, however most prominent are the two ‘folk psychology’
items.
2.5.2.3. Factor 3: Epistemic scepticism. The third component
incorporates seven of ten of those items corresponding to
scientiﬁc/physical scepticism, and additionally two items corre-
sponding to the portrayal of climate change. We argue that each of
the items loading highly on component 3 relate primarily to what
we term ‘epistemic scepticism’ – that is, they relate to the (lack of)
acceptance of the physical or scientiﬁc basis of climate change and
the way this is represented.2.5.3. Relationships between scepticism types, self-identifying
scepticism and level of concern
We now present further analyses utilising the two factors
incorporating the majority of items from the PCA, corresponding to
‘response scepticism’ and ‘epistemic scepticism’ (components 1
and 3 respectively as shown in Table 4).
In order to provide an indication of the extent to which each is
aligned with a lack of engagement, we examined the association
between the scepticism factors and the measure of concern. We
calculated the partial correlation between response scepticism and
level of concern (controlling for the remaining two components);
likewise the partial correlation between level of concern and
epistemic scepticism (again controlling for the other two compo-
nents).
It is a key ﬁnding of the study that a negative association with
concern about climate change is signiﬁcantly more pronounced for
the response scepticism factor (r = .40, p < .001) than it is for the
epistemic scepticism factor (r = .25, p < .001); Fisher’s z test (a
test of whether there is a signiﬁcant difference between two
correlations), z = 2.21, p < .05 (using one-tailed test).
In order to provide an indication of whether the two scepticism
types are associated with people’s perception of the extent to
which they see themselves as climate sceptical, we examine in a
similar manner the partial correlations between scepticism types
and the measure of self-identifying scepticism. Partial correlations
reveal that self-identifying scepticism shows a similar strength of
association with epistemic scepticism (r = .60, p < .001) as with
response scepticism (r = .58, p < .001).
2.5.4. Determinants of scepticism types
Two separate linear regression analyses were conducted upon
the two scepticism factors. For the ﬁrst models in each regression,
cultural worldview measures were included as predictors; in the
second models, pro-environmental identity and voting intention
were also included (the latter was treated as a binary variable with
Conservative voters assigned a score of 1 and all other voters a
score of 0); the third models added level of education and self-
reported level of knowledge; the fourth models included age and
gender variables.
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cultural theory measure of Individualism was a signiﬁcant and
powerful predictor of both epistemic and response scepticism.
Environmental identity was also highly predictive of both
scepticism types. Where age was included, this was found to be
a signiﬁcant predictor for the epistemic scepticism factor.
2.6. Summary and synthesis of ﬁndings from the qualitative and
quantitative phases
The qualitative thematic phase of the research outlined in
Section 2 utilised a framework derived from Capstick (2012) which
was used to identify themes grouped under the broad headings of
‘scientiﬁc/physical scepticism’ and ‘social/behavioural scepticism’.
Scepticism themes derived from the consideration of participant
talk related to such aspects as the evidence base and conduct of
climate science, and towards the efﬁcacy and value of responding
to climate change at the individual and societal level. We
suggested that the discursive function of these two types of
scepticism was distinct: the former serving to construct climate
change as an objectively uncertain phenomenon, the latter serving
to explain or justify lack of action on climate change.
The quantitative phase of the research utilised a twenty-item
survey instrument, constructed to reﬂect the key themes arising
from the qualitative phase. Principal components analysis found
that the broad prior framework from the qualitative phase did not
translate straightforwardly into latent factors. However, two
underlying factors were identiﬁed which included the majority
of survey items, and which incorporated common constructs from
the qualitative thematic phase. The ﬁrst of these factors we termed
‘response scepticism’ as this incorporated doubts about respond-
ing to climate change at the individual and societal level, as well as
items corresponding to climate change fatigue. The second of these
factors we termed ‘epistemic scepticism’ as this incorporated
doubts about the physical and scientiﬁc basis of climate change
and the way this is represented.
In synthesising these two sets of ﬁndings we suggest there are
two emergent types of scepticism which, we argue, integrate
characteristics common to both the qualitative and quantitative
research phases. Fig. 2 provides a summary illustration of the
process by which these types are derived.
The ﬁrst scepticism type we propose incorporates concepts
derived from the notions of scientiﬁc/physical and epistemic
scepticism as used in the two research phases. The deﬁning featureQualitave phase Quantave phase Synthesis
Scienﬁc/physical scepcism
- aribuon (human 
causaon)
- evidence base 
- lack of consensus
- experse
- academic impropriety
- impact 
Social/behavioural scepcism
- response scepcism –
individual
- response scepcism –
polical
- climate change fague
- folk psychology
- portrayal and 
communicaon
Epistemic scepcism
- aribuon (human 
causaon)
- evidence base
- lack of consensus
- experse
- academic propriety
- portrayal and 
communicaon
Response scepcism
- response scepcism 
– individual
- response scepcism 
– polical
- climate change 
fague
‘Folk Psychology’ scepcism
Epistemic scepcism
Doubts about the status and 
generaon of knowledge 
around climate change as a 
physical phenomenon
Response scepcism
Doubts about the eﬃcacy of 
acon on climate change; 
doubts about the personal 
and societal relevance of 
climate change
Unresolved constructs
- Folk psychology
- Impact scepcism
Fig. 2. Synthesis of ﬁndings from qualitative and quantitative phases.of this type of scepticism, common to conceptualisations used in
both research phases, is doubt or uncertainty about the status and
generation of knowledge around climate change as a physical
phenomenon. We retain the term ‘epistemic scepticism’ to reﬂect
that this type of scepticism is concerned fundamentally with the
factual basis and objective realities of climate change.
The second scepticism type we propose incorporates concepts
spanning the notions of social/behavioural and response scepti-
cism as used in the two research phases. This type of scepticism is
characterised by doubts about the efﬁcacy of action on climate
change, and regarding the personal and societal relevance of
climate change as an issue. We retain the term ‘response
scepticism’ to reﬂect that this type of scepticism is concerned
primarily with action taken to respond to climate change (rather
than to do with its objective reality).
Whilst people’s perspectives concerning folk psychology and
impact scepticism are of interest in how people understand and
respond to climate change, neither clearly emerge from the
quantitative PCA as being related to the central concepts of the two
main scepticism types. We thus do not argue that they be
incorporated into the dual typology we propose here. This is
considered further within the Discussion.
3. Discussion
The present study has used a sequential, mixed methodology to
develop and distinguish between two main scepticism types,
which we term epistemic scepticism and response scepticism.
Analysis of discussion group transcripts has shown that both
these type of scepticism are expressed in participants’ talk about
climate change. Analysis of survey data ﬁnds that constructs
central to these two types emerge as latent factors within a
principal components analysis.
3.1. Epistemic scepticism – characteristics and consequences
Previous research has considered climate change scepticism in
terms of the public’s doubts about the physical existence, human
component and severity of climate change (Poortinga et al., 2011).
The present study extends this work empirically by obtaining
evidence for the coherence of doubts around the reality and human
contribution to climate change within a broad scepticism type, and
conceptually by showing that these sorts of doubts tend also to be
associated with scepticism concerning the evidence base, level of
consensus and practice of climate science.
The present study is not the ﬁrst to have applied the idea of
epistemic scepticism in the area of climate change. In recent work
which examined the beliefs of individuals who self-identiﬁed as
being sceptical or disbelieving about climate change, Hobson and
Niemeyer (2013) also refer to epistemic scepticism in the context
of doubts about the reality, causality and impacts of climate change
– reﬂecting the typology originally advanced by Rahmstorf (2004)
and tested empirically by Poortinga et al. (2011). The present study
differs from the approach taken by these previous studies,
however, by arguing that epistemic scepticism also incorporates
doubts which centre on climate science and scientists.
Our qualitative analysis of research participants’ talk shows
that such scepticism relates to perceptions of the legitimacy of
climate science claims; this is consistent with studies dating back
to the mid-1990s (Darier et al., 1999). In addition, some
participants contextualised their doubts to allegations about
academic impropriety pertinent to the time this research was
conducted (the so-called ‘Climategate’ controversy; cf. Shuckburgh
et al., 2012). Whilst a number of commentators have suggested
that this may have impacted public perspectives (e.g. Leiserowitz
et al., 2010; Gavin and Marshall, 2011; Maibach et al., 2012;
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identiﬁed this in people’s spontaneous expressions of doubt.
We argue that the consequences of epistemic scepticism are
important, as in their essence they disclaim the basic tenets of
climate science as assembled through bodies such as the IPCC and
represented by the broad tenor of the academic literature (e.g.
Anderegg et al., 2010; Doran and Zimmerman, 2009). What might
explain the presence of this type of scepticism? It seems likely ﬁrst
of all that people’s doubts around climate science and its
knowledge claims are aligned with a particular idea of what
‘science’ is – participants speak for example of a lack of ‘proof’ or
refer to uncertainty in pejorative terms. In this, participants appear
to be drawing on a view of (climate) science as a process which
produces certainty (Collins, 1987) and that science aims and is able
to determine a ‘true’ picture of the world (Bauer et al., 2000).
Doubts about climate science in particular may also be reﬂections
of a more universal belief among the public that there are clear
limits to the levels of knowledge that scientists actually possess in
the domain of socio-technical risks (Sjo¨berg, 2001; Sjo¨berg and
Herber, 2008). In addition, inaccurate media portrayals of
uncertainty (e.g. Boykoff and Mansﬁeld, 2008) have likely under-
pinned the persistence of epistemic scepticism in the case of
climate change.
Participants’ scepticism about an anthropogenic component to
climate change may similarly be connected to doubts towards
climate science – however likely also reﬂects the inﬂuence of
deeply ingrained views about how natural systems operate,
whereby climate may be understood as part of a natural world
which is in essence ever-changing, self-regulating and cyclical (cf.
West et al., 2010; Ladle and Gillson, 2009). The notion of ‘natural’
climate change thus represents a plausible alternative explanation
for material which might otherwise be difﬁcult to ignore (e.g.
global temperature increase).
3.2. Response scepticism – characteristics and consequences
The second scepticism type which we identify, which we term
‘response scepticism’, concerns doubts about the effectiveness of
responding, and willingness and capacity to respond to climate
change at the personal, political and societal levels. As we noted in
Sections 1.2 and 1.3, previous studies have (explicitly or
implicitly) tended also to talk of scepticism in similar ways; as
importantly, we ﬁnd that survey respondents’ own conception of
what constitutes climate scepticism is related to these ideas: the
degree to which people self-identify as being a climate sceptic is
strongly and independently associated with response scepticism
measures.
Previous studies have noted both that climate change
constitutes a large-scale social dilemma (Irwin, 2009; Turnpenny
et al., 2009) and that the public themselves recognise this inherent
characteristic and its implications. Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006)
have, for example, suggested that people perceive low personal
efﬁcacy for action on climate change due to its being considered
too large and complex a problem for individuals alone to address. It
has been argued that a social dilemma perspective leads to people’s
direction of responsibility to institutional actors such as (inter)na-
tional government (Bickerstaff et al., 2008); the present study ﬁnds
that doubts about the capacity of these actors to act on climate
change is also incorporated into people’s scepticism. This was both
in terms of people’s reﬂections on the COP15 process and more
generally: over a third of survey respondents agreed there is ‘very
little’ politicians can do about climate change. Such scepticism
about the political response to climate change may reﬂect wider
disconnection with politics in recent years (Hay, 2007) and is likely
also to be a result of the increasing politicisation of climate change
over time (Jordan and Lorenzoni, 2007; McCright and Dunlap,2011). It may also characterise a generally fatalistic perspective –
doubts about personal, collective and political responses to climate
change were incorporated into the response scepticism factor
together with the notion that it is ‘too late’ to act on climate
change.
Such perspectives constitute a coherent and particularly disen-
gaged cluster of viewpoints: as well as factoring together, they are
strongly associated with a lack of concern about climate change. The
ﬁnding that response scepticism is more strongly associated with a
lack of concern (than is epistemic scepticism) may also be explained
in part due to a relationship between the constituent constructs and
a wider sense of fatalism or resignation. In according with the view
that there is ‘no point’ in acting on climate change and that it is ‘too
late’ to act, participants express the idea that there is little prospect
of climate change being effectively addressed. Such a sense of
fatalism around climate change has been previously shown to be
linked to a lack of engagement (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009).
Such perspectives as expressed within participant talk also
encompass this manner of fatalism – for example people express
feeling ‘helpless’ and that there are ‘no answers’ – which again may
be expected to correspond to lack of engagement and concern. The
lack of efﬁcacy conveyed by the sense that there is ‘no point’ in acting
also relates to research which has afﬁrmed a connection between
perceived personal efﬁcacy and climate change concern (Milfont,
2012) and which has pointed to the importance of efﬁcacy
constructs for determining personal responses to climate change
(Gifford, 2011; Kellstedt et al., 2008).
3.3. Underpinnings of climate scepticism
That people’s cultural worldviews are powerful predictors of
scepticism about the physical and scientiﬁc aspects of climate
change is in line with previous research by Kahan et al. (2011) and
Leiserowitz et al. (2010). In the present study, moreover, we have
demonstrated that cultural worldviews are separately predictive of
scepticism about the social and behavioural aspects of climate
change. Cultural worldviews are thought to exert inﬂuence upon
climate change perceptions through leading people to selectively
interpret evidence about risks in line with their pre-existing
outlooks. According to two of the early originators of cultural
theory, this takes place because individuals ‘choose’ what to
believe in line with preferences for particular types of social
relations (Wildavsky and Dake, 1990). The present study suggests
that this ‘choice’ extends not just to perceptions of the scientiﬁc
basis and physical aspects of climate change, but also into the
social and behavioural domain. This is important because these
latter types of doubts need not be premised on the former: indeed,
to be of the view that it is ‘too late’ to act on climate change or that
the problem is ‘too complicated’ (as in the response scepticism
factor) presumes there is a problem in the ﬁrst place. Discussion
participants’ remarks also reﬂect in many places an acceptance of
the reality of anthropogenic climate change, in concert with doubts
about the effectiveness of mitigation responses. From a cultural
theoretical perspective, such response scepticism is arguably
underpinned by an individualistic worldview in which one’s
preferred social relations (atomistic and characterised by personal
autonomy) are anathema to the idea that collective effort is
required to address a social dilemma such as climate change (cf.
Pendergraft, 1998): this is indeed supported by the results of the
regression analysis of the present study which ﬁnds Individualism
to be a powerful predictor of response scepticism.
3.4. Limitations of the study and further research
Whilst we ﬁnd evidence for distinct scepticism types through
the use of principal components analysis, nevertheless the
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distinctions is partial. Whilst doubts about responses to climate
change cohered together within the principal components analy-
sis, the items designed to test a ‘folk psychology’ scepticism – that
people are in general ‘selﬁsh’ or that ‘human nature’ itself
precludes action on climate change – did not factor within the
response scepticism construct. These folk psychology scepticism
items nevertheless received high levels of agreement, with almost
two-thirds of respondents of the view that people are ‘too selﬁsh’
to act on climate change. That these types of perspective are
widespread – including across Europe (Fischer et al., 2011) – points
to an important and under-explored role for the ways in which
people’s views about humanity in general may affect their
understanding of climate change. As Fischer et al. (2011) argue,
such attitudes could be expected to hinder rather than foster action
on climate change. Further research is required to ascertain
whether these types of views do constitute an impediment to
engagement, and whether they are consistent with more general
sceptical views or are a distinctive way of understanding the place
of humanity in causing and responding to climate change.
The survey items used reﬂect a range of sceptical perspectives,
however given the extensive array of climate change perception
measures now available (Roser-Renouf and Nisbet, 2008) alterna-
tive means of gauging perceptions may have been incorporated. In
the present study we have used some novel items, such as to gauge
climate ‘fatigue’, which require further attention as to their
association with scepticism. In light of these limitations, additional
research would be useful to carefully consolidate the distinction
between scepticism types and to clarify the more salient
components of each. That the present ﬁndings are obtained in a
UK context is an additional limitation – the characteristics of public
debate around climate change in the USA (McCright and Dunlap,
2011) might suggest different characteristics of scepticism there.
The focus of the present study has been exclusively upon
scepticism – as such we have been concerned with one part of the
broader ways in which climate change is understood. Despite
many reasons to expect people’s doubts about climate change to
have grown, recent studies do point to newly increased concern
about climate change in Europe and the USA (Eurobarometer,
2011; Gallup, 2013). That we argue that public scepticism in the UK
context is coherent and complex should not therefore be taken to
automatically suggest this reﬂects the prevailing public mood
around climate change.
3.5. Implications for public engagement with climate change
The present study ﬁnds that of the two scepticism types that we
focus upon, scepticism about responding to climate change is more
strongly associated with a lack of concern. This is important
because, whilst there are clear arguments which can be made
concerning the level of scientiﬁc consensus and degree of
conﬁdence in an anthropogenic component to climate change,
doubts concerning personal and societal responses to climate
change are in essence more disputable.
To date, the majority of work focussing on communicating
climate change has tended to be concerned with aspects of climate
science. We suggest, however, that additional efforts are required
to identify and engage with the doubts held by people concerning
the relevance and effectiveness of measures taken to address
climate change. Whilst a substantial literature has now developed
around strategies for promoting behavioural responses to climate
change (e.g. Swim et al., 2010; Whitmarsh et al., 2011) neverthe-
less this has tended not to directly address people’s fundamental
misgivings about the value of such responses in themselves. To do
so is complicated by the fact that a person cannot be said to be
‘wrong’ should they be sceptical in this way. Perhaps then, themost appropriate strategy may be to acknowledge the validity of
such doubts, but in such a way that nevertheless permits the value
of personal and societal action on climate change to be
emphasised. This may be most likely to work where individual
action is contextualised to common efforts (notwithstanding that
this may be particularly challenging for those of an individualistic
disposition). Connections made with the effectiveness of collective
action (Koletsou and Mancy, 2012), including promotion of
environmental citizenship (Wolf, 2011), participatory democracy
(van den Hove, 2000) and decision-making at local scales (Rayner,
2010) may be some ways in which this could be achieved. Likewise,
Van Zomeren et al. (2010) have shown that communicating strong
group efﬁcacy beliefs (conveying the message that people are able
to collectively address climate change) can increase individuals’
pro-environmental behaviour intentions.
We suggest ﬁnally that in future research and where using the
term ‘scepticism’ to refer to people’s doubts about climate change,
a more ﬁne-grained distinction is made between whether
reference is being made to doubts about the physical properties
of climate and the status of climate science, or whether about the
human dimensions of climate change. The present study has
provided one such framework by which this could be achieved.
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